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ENIGMATIC GRANTS OF LAW-MAKING
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE
WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION
JACK STARK*

The Wisconsin Constitution includes two types of statements about
the authority and duty to make laws. The first type is clear, direct and
general. This type appears in Article IV, the article pertaining to the
legislature. In that article, the constitution vests legislative power in
both houses of the legislature-the senate and assembly.1 The second
type of statement appears throughout the constitution. Such statements
are enigmatic because one cannot be certain about the scope of the
lawmaking authority that instances of that type grant, because each is
limited to a particular subject about which laws might be enacted and
because many of the instances indirectly grant authority. The second
type is also enigmatic because the wording of the instances of it varies
considerably. Some of them even restrict lawmaking authority. As one
would expect, the case law on the second type of statement is rich and
somewhat surprising.
One may begin to understand the enigmatic type of statements in
the Wisconsin constitution by classifying instances of it. Even if one
allows small variations in phrasing among the members of some classes
(and interprets instances so as to reflect modem drafting conventions),
there are fifteen classes of instances in the Wisconsin Constitution: (1)
"the legislature may... by statute provide;" 2 (2) "the legislature by law
may;"3 (3) "as defined by law;",4 (4) "the legislature shall provide;"5 (5)

* B.A. 1961, Northland College; M.A. 1963, Claremont; Ph.D 1969, University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1979, University of Wisconsin.
1. WIS. CONST. art IV, § 1.
2. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 5.

3. WIS. CONS. art. I, § 8, cl. 2-3; art. IV, § 32; art. VII, § 14; art. X, § 3; art. XI, § 4.
4. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 5; art. I, § 7; art. I, § 9m; art. I, § 21, cl. 1; art. IV, § 29; art. VI, §
3; art. VII, § 5, cl. 2; art. VII, § 5, cl. 3; art. VII, § 10, cl. 2; art. VII, § 12; art. VIII, § 1; art.
VIII, § 6; art. XII, § 1.
5. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m; art. IV, § 3; art. IV, § 17, cl. 3; art. IV, § 23; art. IV, § 25; art.
IV, § 27; art. IV, § 29; art. IV, § 33; art. IV, § 34; art. VI, § 3; art. VIII, § 5; art. VIII, § 6; art.
VIII, § 2, cl. e; art. VIII, § 7, cl. f; art. X, § 1; art. XII, § 2; art. XIII, § 4.
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(a prohibition) "no law;"6 (6)"shall be recognized by laws;"7 (7) "the
legislature may;"8 (8) "laws may be enacted;" 9 (9) "the legislature may,
except... ;,10 (10) (another prohibition) "the legislature may not, ex-

cept... ;"" (11) "the legislature by law shall;' 12 (12) (relating to impeachment) "the assembly may;"" (13) "except as provided by law;"' 4
(14) (another
prohibition) "the legislature may not;" 15 and (15) "except
'6
by law.'
The phrasing of the preceding statements creates at least three difficulties. The first is immediately apparent. The bewildering variety of
phrasings makes it unclear whether each statement has the same legal
effect. If the effect of all the statements is not equal, the effect of each
is difficult to determine. Second, those statements that direct or

authorize the legislature to enact a law do not reflect the constitutional
requirement that bills be presented to the governor. 7 This requirement

makes it impossible for the legislature single-handedly to enact a law
unless it overrides a gubernatorial veto. The third difficulty is that the
words "by law" are ambiguous. This phrase might mean that joint
resolutions, which do not require action by the governor, will not suffice. This makes sense in light of the presentment requirement's scope.
In fact, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin did construe the phrase that

way. Interpreting two constitutional provisions regarding reapportionment, one of which included "by law" and the other of which did not,
the court, in State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman,"' held that "[w]e can

see no reason why the constitutional framers should have intended that
the congressional redistricting must be by law but that legislative redistricting might be by action of the legislature alone."19 The use of "by
6. WIs. CONST. art. I, § 3; art. I, § 12; art. I, § 15; art. I, § 18; art. VIII, § 2; art. XIII, § 7;
art. X, § 5.
7. WIS. CONsT. art. I, § 17; art. X, § 5; art. X, § 6; art. X, § 8.
8. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 23; art. I, § 24; art. IV, § 22; art. IV, § 23; art. IV, § 24, cl. 3; art.
IV, § 24, cl. 4; art. IV, § 24, cl. 6a; art. IV, § 32; art. VIII, § 1; art. VIII, § 7, c. 1; art. VIII, §
10, cl. 2; art. X, § 1; art. XI, § 1; art. XII, § 1; art. XIII, § 10, di. 1.
9. WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2; art. IV, § 28; art. XI, § 1.
10. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 24; art. VII, § 13.
11. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 24; art. VII, § 28.
12. WIS. CONsT. art. IV, § 27; art. VII, § 5 cl. 1; art. VII, § 6; art. X, § 1; art. X, § 3.
13. WIs. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
14. WIS. CONsT. art. VII, § 8; art. VIII, § 2.
15. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3; art. IV, § 17, cl. 2; art. IV, § 26, cd. 1; art. IV, § 31.
16. WIs. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; art. XII, § 8.
17. WIS. CONsT. art. X, § 5.
18. 22 Wis. 2d 544, 126 N.W.2d 551 (1964).
19. Id. at 554, 126 N.W. 2d at 557.
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law" probably also means that rulemaking by an administrative agency
will not suffice if a constitutional provision requires lawmaking. Rules
have the force of law;' however, they are not law. Further, rules are
promulgated by executive agencies, not enacted by the legislature and
the governor. About the phrases in which "by law" appears and in
which there is no reference to the legislature, it could be argued that action by a court, another law-making body, would suffice. The court in
Reynolds convincingly solved these problems. Except for the constitutional provision that mentions the state assembly's unilateral action, all
the other enigmatic phrases refer to the enactment of statutory law.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS

The references to these enigmatic phrases in the debate during the
constitutional conventions are certainly evidence of the way in which
the phrases should be interpreted.' One caveat is in order. Some of the
debate relevant to those phrases concerned whether to specify the value
of property that would be exempt from execution under a judgment or
to make a general statement so that the amount could later be specified
by statute. This "value of property" exemption, banking and women's
property rights were the three most controversial issues during the debate on and the campaign for ratification of the first proposed state
constitution. Voters later rejected the first draft. The exemption was
also a major issue during the debate at the second constitutional convention. The bipartisanship that pertained during most of that convention often dissipated when that issue arose. Some delegates favored
borrowers; others favored lenders. A few of the remarks that the delegates made during arguments-about whether to include a dollar amount
in the constitution seem to be based not only on conceptions about the
propriety of doing so but also on a calculation about whether the convention's delegates or the legislature and governor would agree upon a
higher amount. At one point, Mr. Stoddard Judd, recognizing an unstated motive, pointed out that Mr. Experience Estabrook, who had recently argued against specifying an exemption amount in the constitution, had earlier voted to specify in the constitution the amount of
20. WIS.STAT. § 227.01(13) (1996).

21. Recently Wisconsin courts have interpreted constitutional provisions by analyzing
their plain meaning, discussing the contemporary material on them (usually the debates
during the constitutional convention) and the first law enacted on their subject matter. See,
e.g., Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674,546 N.W. 2d 123 (1996); Bus6 v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d
550,247 N.W.2d 141 (1976); Board of Education v. Sinclair, 65 Wis. 2d 179,222 N.W. 2d 143
(1974); State ex rel. Martin v. Heil, 242 Wis. 41,7 N.W. 2d 375 (1942).
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Supreme Court justices' salaries. '
Even allowing for certain delegates' ulterior motives, one can discern two themes in the debate. The first is that the constitution ought
to enunciate broad principles, while the statutes should specify details.'
Some delegates recognized that this distinction is most obviously valid
in regard to details that might become inappropriate because of the passage of time. Two examples are the details that were just mentioned:
the amount of the "value of property" exemption and the amount of
judges' salaries. However, Mr. Warren Chase argued that the distinction between general principles and details was not always clear and absolute.' Moreover, the delegates did include details in the constitution,
including among them some that almost certainly would become outmoded, such as the amount of judges' salaries and the geographical extent of each circuit court's jurisdiction.2' Despite Mr. Chase's warning
and the delegates' own mixed motives, if the delegates believed that a
detail should be left to the legislature and the governor, they usually
added one of the enigmatic references to enacting statutory law. That
fairly consistent practice indicates that the delegates understood the nature of constitutions, but at first glance that practice does little to illuminate the enigmatic statements, because the constitution's general
grant of legislative authority would, by itself, allow the legislature to enact laws that filled in details. 26 Nevertheless, the addition of those
phrases indicated that legislative work needed to be done and foreshadowed one of the themes in the case law that would interpret those
phrases. The delegates' actions also indicate that the constitutional
provisions in which the enigmatic statements appear are not selfexecuting.

The second discernible theme in the debate is that the constitution
directs the legislative and executive branches of government. Most important for the question of the enigmatic phrases' meaning, the constitution directs those branches as they exercise their authority to enact
laws. This direction has both a positive and a negative aspect. As to the
positive aspect, the constitution directs the legislature to act by initiating the statute-making process.' The constitution thus implicitly bestows upon the legislature the authority to initiate that process. As to
22. THE ATTAINMENT OF STATEHOOD 755 (Milo Quaife ed., 1928).

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 285, 293, 297, 771,794.
Id at 763.
WIS. CONsT. art. VII, 10, art. VII, § 5.
WIS. CONST. art. IV, 1.
THE ATTAINMENT OF STATEHOOD, supra note 21, at 287,291,764.
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the negative aspect, the constitution sometimes constrains the legislature. For example, the constitution specifies a number of individual
rights in Article I that legislation may not abridge. 8 This theme, too,
foreshadows a major theme in the case law: that the phrases do not
grant plenary power to the legislature and the governor. Of the two aspects, constraint is echoed more frequently in the pertinent case law.
II. THE PROVISIONS ARE NOT SELF-EXECUTING
One of the main themes in the case law is that the presence of an
enigmatic phrase about lawmaking authority indicates that the constitutional provision is not self-executing. That is, by itself a phrase of that
type does not forbid, authorize, or require any behavior (the three functions of statutory law).29 A provision that includes such a phrase has no
effect unless the legislature and the governor implement it by enacting
legislation. Contrasting a provision that does not contain one of the
enigmatic phrases to a provision that does contain one will clarify this
point. A provision of the first type is "[e]very person may freely speak,
write and publish his sentiments on all subjects." 3 That statement immediately and directly grants rights, which may be vindicated in court,
and litigants may attack statutes that might contravene them. A contrasting provision is "[tiaxation of agricultural land and undeveloped
land, both as defined by law, need not be uniform with the taxation of
each other or with the taxation of other real property., 3' Absent the
enactment of statutory law to define agricultural land for taxation purposes, an assessor may not, for example, assess that kind of land at 50%
of its fair market value and assess all other taxable property at 100% of
its fair market value. That latter portion of the constitution put on
firmer legal footing the ensuing enactment of the farmland preservation
program, under which owners of agricultural land receive income tax
credits that offset some of their property tax liability. 2 Without the
constitutional provision that credit would grant a partial property tax
exemption and thus would result in nonuniform property taxation, so it
would have violated the section in the constitution of which the provi28. Id. at 290,402.
29. Virtually all statutes perform one of those functions or state conditions or consequences related to the behavior that is forbidden, authorized or required. See JACK STARK,
THE ART OFTHE STATUTE

7-11 (1996).

30. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 3.
31. WIS. CONST. art VIII, § 1.
32. See Jack Stark, A History of the Property Tax and Property Tax Relief in Wisconsin,
in STATE OF WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, 101,153-54 (1991).
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sion is a part.33 However, the provision's efficacy depended upon legislation. After a statutory definition was created, the authorization of
unique taxation of agricultural land became effective, and that authorization made possible the enactment of a constitutional farmland preservation credit, which included that definition.' 4
One section of the constitution is explicitly self-executing. Its final
subsection is "[t]his section shall be self-executing and mandatory.
Laws may be enacted to facilitate its operation but no law shall be enacted to hamper, restrict or impair the right of recall."35 This section
grants to the voters the right to recall elected officials, a right that the
elected officials who sit in the legislature might be tempted to fail to
implement by statute. As we shall see, the case law had demonstrated
before that section was ratified in 1926 that constitutional provisions
that do not contain an enigmatic expression are self-executing. Including that final subsection might have cast doubt on that general rule because it would encourage courts to wonder why that subsection was
necessary and, therefore, to wonder whether the rule was indeed general. On the other hand, it might have done no harm or have been a
prudent addition that ensured that courts would interpret the section to
be self-executing.
The first case36 distinguishing self-executing constitutional provisions
from others involved a provision that in this context is interesting for
two reasons. First, that provision concerned the exemption from judgments, the debate on which at the second constitutional convention did
much to reveal the beliefs of the delegates about the differences between constitutions and statutes. Second, that convention, rather than
specifying an exemption amount, wrote the following: "[tihe privilege of
the debtor to enjoy the necessary comforts of life shall be recognized by
wholesome laws, exempting a reasonable amount of property from seizure or sale for the payment of any debt or liability hereafter contracted."' That section did not merely indicate that the legislature was
to fill in the details; it also directed the legislature to do so and established two standards ("wholesome laws" and "reasonable amount"), al33. Jack Stark, The Uniformity Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution,76 MARQ. L. REv.
577 (1993). Actually, that program was upheld as a welfare, not a tax, provision in McManus
v. Department of Revenue, 155 Wis. 2d 450,455 N.W.2d 906 (Ct. App. 1990).
34. The definition is actually of "farmland," not "agricultural land," and now appears at
WIS. STAT. § 71.58 (3).
35. WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 12, cl. 7.
36. 13 Wis. 260 (1860).
37. WIS. CONST. art I, § 17.
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beit vague ones, for the statutes that were to be enacted. Because the
legislature was directed, not merely authorized, to act and had failed to
do so, if a court were ever tempted to hold that a constitutional provision was self-executing despite the appearance in it of one of the enigmatic expressions it would have occurred in a case on that type of enigmatic grants of lawmaking authority. Nevertheless, in this case the
court refrained from doing so, holding that "[t]here can be no doubt
that the courts possess no power to compel the legislature to enact the
laws required by that section; nor could they, in the absence of any statutes upon the subject, by judicial decision supply the deficiency."38
The next case in this line, The Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul
Railway Co. v. State,39 was brought on Article IV, section 27, which
specified that "the legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in
what courts suits may be brought against the state."' 4 The court in this
case was the first to use the term self-executing. Of the constitutional
provision, the court held "it is not self-executing, and manifestly was not
so intended. Otherwise, the mandate would have been to the courts instead of the legislature .... "41 This was another case in which a court
might have been sorely tempted to hold that it could execute a constitutional provision that included an enigmatic phrase, rather than waiting
for the legislature to execute it. The temptation would have arisen from
the fact that the provision at issue regulated the courts' operation and
thus intruded on the judiciary's power. The constitution itself vested
the judicial power in the courts.' Nevertheless, the court deferred to
the legislature and upheld a statute that required filing a claim against
the state with the legislature before commencing litigation against the
state.
In spite of several unusual facts, the next pertinent case, Kayden Industries, Inc., v. Murphy,43 significantly clarified the relation between
the enigmatic phrases and the self-executing nature of constitutional
provisions that do not contain an enigmatic phrase. This was a case on
the lottery section of the constitution.' It is well established that lotteries have three elements: a prize, chance and consideration. 4 Part of
38. Conroe, 13 Wis. at 265.
39. 53 Wis. 509, 10 N.W. 560 (1881).
40. WIS. CONST. art IV, § 27.
41. The Chicago, Milwaukee and SL Paul Ry. Co., 53 Wis. at 513, 10 N.W. at 561.
42. WIS. CONST. art VII, § 2.

43. 34 Wis. 2d 718,150 N.W.2d 447 (1967).
44. WIS. CONST. art IV, § 24.
45. 34 Wis. 2d at 724, 150 N.W.2d at 452 (citing State ex rel. Cowie v. La Crosse Thea-
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that section consisted of a list of things that were not consideration for
defining a lottery. The unusual feature of the list was its introductory
phrase: "[e]xcept as the legislature may provide otherwise. " Thus, this
provision allowed the legislature to eliminate items from the list of exceptions. The section also prohibited lotteries, so the enigmatic phrase
applied only to part of the section. The next unusual feature of this case
is that it also involved a statute that had been enacted to codify the list
in the constitution, almost as if the legislature were reacting to the arguments of those members of the constitutional convention who believed that details belong in statutes, not in constitutions. To exacerbate the complications, in the next year, 1966, a statute that changed the
list of exceptions to the items that were consideration was enacted: the
legislature exercised its authority to "provide otherwise."
From this unusual material on gambling the court fashioned a rational analysis of the relation between the enigmatic phrases and the
self-execution of constitutional provisions. The court quoted an encyclopedia: "[a] constitutional provision is self-executing if no legislation
is necessary to give effect to it, and if there is nothing to be done by the
legislature to put it in operation. A constitutional provision contemplating and requiring legislation is not self-executing." 47 Recognizing
that the enigmatic phrase applied only to deleting items from the list of
things that were not consideration, the court held that the general prohibition against lotteries and the list in the constitution were selfexecuting. 4' As to that list, entering a mercantile establishment, the issue in this case, was not consideration at first. However, the legislation
that was enacted during the next year removed that exception. After
untangling the case's oddities, the court left a clear distinction: constitutional provisions that did not refer to statute making were selfexecuting, and constitutional provisions that did refer to statutemaking
were not self-executing.
The distinction was so clear that during the next year, in Forseth v.
Sweet 49 the plaintiff conceded that a constitutional provision containing
one of the enigmatic phrases was not self-executing and then argued
that a statute had executed the provision.' The constitutional provision
tres Co., 232 Wis. 153,286 N.W. 707 (1939)).
46. WIS. CONST. art IV, § 24.
47. Kayden, 34 Wis. 2d at 731, 150 N.W.2d at 453 (quoting 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law, § 94 (1965)).
48. I. at 732, 150 N.W.2d at 453.
49. 38 Wis. 2d 676, 158 N.W.2d 370 (1968).
50. Id at 679, 158 N.W.2d at 371.
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was Article IV, section 27: "[t]he legislature shall direct by law in what
manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the state." 1
The facts that the order to the legislature was explicit and one of the
easier to interpret of the enigmatic phrases may have helped to induce
the concession. 2 In any event, at that time the case law on this issue,
despite the small number of relevant opinions, appeared to be consistent and clear. Moreover, during the next year, in Chart v. Gutmann,3
the court explicitly followed Forseth v. Sweet on this issue.m In a later
5 the court again held that Article IV, section
case, Kallembach v. State,"
56 In a number of other cases on that section, the
27 is not self-executing.
court, although it did not distinguish between constitutional provisions
that are self-executing and those that are not, held that a suit may not
be brought against the state unless a statute explicitly authorizes such a
suit.-7
III. THEY IMPOSE A DUTY To LEGISLATE
Another theme in the case law on the enigmatic phrases is that they
impose on the legislature and governor a duty to enact laws. Just as
most of the cases holding that the phrases indicate that a constitutional
provision is not self-executing involved Article IV, section 27, most of
the cases that developed this theme involved article VII, section 15.
That section, which was repealed during 1966, provided for the election
direct."5
of justices of the peace "in such manner as the legislature may
An exception is the first case in which a court so held, Bull v. Conroe,59
which was discussed aboveW and which was on Article I, section 17, the
provision that required an exemption from judgments for debtors. The
court in that case referred to "the laws required by that section" and
remarked that failing to enact laws exempting property from exemption
would "be a clear violation of the plainly expressed will of the people."'"
51. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 27.
52. 38 Wis. 2d at 690.
53. 44 Wis. 2d 421,171 N.W.2d 331 (1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 973 (1970).
54. Chart,44 Wis. 2d at 427,171 N.W.2d at 334.
55. 129 Wis. 2d 402,385 N.W.2d 215 (Ct. App. 1986).
56. Id. at 409,385 N.W.2d at 218.
57. State ex rel Teach. Assts. v. Wis-Madison Univ., 96 Wis. 2d 492, 292 N.W. 2d 657 (Ct.
App. 1980); Fiola v. Voight, 93 Wis. 2d 337,286 N.W. 2d 824 (1980); Houston v. State, 98 Wis.
481,74 N.W. 111 (1898).
58. WIs. CONST. art IV, § 15 repealedby 1965 J.R. 50.
59. 13 Wis. 260 (1860).
60. Text accompanying footnote 34.
61. Id. at 265.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:961

Nevertheless, as we have seen, the court acknowledged that it had no
power to compel the legislature to execute the provision. In later cases
the courts were less deferential. The first of the relevant cases on article IV, section 27 is State ex rel. Wood v. Goldstucker and Another.6
Goldstucker had been elected a justice of the peace before the legislature repealed the portion of Fond du Lac's charter that created that position. The court held that the constitutional provision mandated a law
on the election of a justice of the peace, particularly because there once
had been such a law, and that, therefore, Goldstucker still held office.6'
The second case in the line, Trogman v. Grover,' had virtually identical
facts, and the result was the same.6 ' The court in the third case, Olson v.
Hawkins," also held that the office, once created, could not be abolished.67 The final case that developed this theme, State ex rel. Reynolds
v. Zimmennan,6" was on Article IV, section 3, which directs the legislature to apportion the state for election purposes after each census. The
court assumed that the legislature must perform that duty and held that
it must perform it by statute.69
IV. THEY Do NOT AUTHORIZE SHAMS
The enigmatic phrases that grant authority to the legislature (by implication, with the concurrence of the governor except in the case of
bills passed notwithstanding vetoes) may at first glance appear to do so
without limitation. The case law indicates otherwise. It indicates, for
example, that laws enacted on the basis of a constitutional provision
that includes one of the enigmatic phrases may not be used to create a
sham. This rejection of shams is the third major theme in the case law
on the enigmatic phrases. All of the cases in which the court so held involved the same section of the constitution. That fact may cast doubt
on their general applicability, but the principle is so rational and, as we
will see, there are so many other limits placed by courts on the statutemaking authority granted by those provisions that the principle almost
certainly would be held to apply regardless of the constitutional provision at issue.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

40 Wis. 124 (1876).
ld. at 130.
109 Wis. 393, 85 N.W. 358 (1901).
IL at 396, 85 N.W. at 359.
135 Wis. 394, 116 N.W. 18 (1908).
Id at 398, 116 N.W. at 19.
22 Wis. 2d 544, 126 N.W.2d 551 (1964).
Id at 557, 126 N.W.2d at 557.
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The part of the constitution that was litigated in those cases is Article XI, section 3. Until it was amended during 1926, that section specified "[i]t shall be the duty of the legislature, and they are hereby empowered, to provide for the organization of cities and incorporated
villages." Under the original version of this subsection, the state government enacted those municipalities' charters, specifying in detail their
powers and duties. Under the current version of that subsection, cities
and villages may govern themselves except for matters of statewide
concern." The case law makes it clear that, under the first version of
the subsection, the state, and, under the second version of the subsection, persons who wish to create a city or village, may not create governmental entities purporting to be cities or villages but lacking the attributes essential to those entities. In fact, the court has usually been
rigorous in enforcing that principle.
The first case in this series, Smith v. Sherry,7 concerned a village the
territory of which was not completely contiguous. The plaintiffs suggested that the motive for the creation of this odd governmental entity
was to include valuable property in the village's tax base; in fact, they
argued that the village's composition violated the uniformity clause ofn
the state constitution, that document's most important tax provision.
The court declined that gambit but held that "where the territory so attempted to be included in a village is not adjacent or contiguous
thereto, and the village has no interest therein as a village, its annexation for the mere purpose of increasing the corporate revenues by the
exaction of taxes is an abuse and violation of that provision of Section 3,
art. XI."' Before the wording of the relevant part of the constitution
was changed, three other cases were brought on the authority to create
municipalities.

The first was State ex rel. Town of Holland v. Lam-

mers,74 in which the plaintiff attacked a statute that allowed any territory that fulfilled certain population and size requirements to become a
village. Upon rehearing, the court held that fulfilling these requirements was not enough, because they allowed the creation of sham villages. Specifically, it held "that the power to incorporate territory as a
village under Section 854, Stats. 1898, is limited to such territory as possesses the characteristics mentioned. It must be a village in fact, with a

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

WIS. CONST. art VI, § 3.
50 Wis. 210,6 N.W. 561 (1880).
Id. at 216,6 N.W. at 567 (citing WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 1).
Id. at 217, 6 N.W. at 564.
113 Wis. 398,86 N.W. 677 (1902).
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reasonably compact center or nucleus of population, and not a mere agricultural community."75 In Fenton v. Ryan76 the area that purported to
be a village had three parts: thirty-eight and one-half acres that were
settled, 465 acres of agricultural land that were not contiguous to the
settled portion and seventy-five acres that were under water. The supreme court affirmed the trial court, holding that the area did not have
the attributes identified by the court in State ex rel. Holland v. Lammers. Two years later, in Incorporationof Town of Biron,' the court
applied the same criteria as had the courts in the two previous cases,
but, even though part of the village's territory was a thin strip across a
river from the village's main body, held that the criteria were fulfilled."
79 the court applied the
In In re Incorporationof Village of St. Francis
village-like test rigorously, as it had in most of the earlier cases. It
held that the area in question was not sufficiently like a village s°
Thus, by 1948 it was clear that Article XI, section 3, despite its broad
phrasing, did not authorize the creation of villages that were not really
villages and that included superfluous land and that courts would most
likely apply those criteria rigorously. The central issues in the next
three cases on this constitutional provision were not whether the entity
created was village-like. In In re Village of Elm Grove"' the issues were
whether even more land should have been included in the villageu and
whether a city, rather than a village, should have been created." The
court in In re Village of Oconomowoc Lake" affirmed the proposition
that a village must be village-like and held that the petition for incorporation must address that issue. 5 The most recent of the three cases is
86 In it the plaintiff argued that his sevIn re Village of Elmwood Park.
enteen-acre parcel should not have been included in the village. s7 The
appellate court rejected the trial court's consideration of a factor, economic effects, in addition to the factors that had been applied in the
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 417, 86 N.W. at 679.
140 Wis. 353,122 N.W. 756 (1909).
146 Wis. 444, 131 N.W. 829 (1911).
Id. at 451, 131 N.W. at 831.
209 Wis. 645,245 N.W. 840 (1932).
Id. at 654,245 N.W. at 549.
267 Wis. 157, 64 N.W.2d 874 (1954).
Id. at 162, 64 N.W.2d at 877.
Id. at 163, 64 N.W.2d at 877-78.
270 Wis. 530,72 N.W.2d 544 (1955).
Id. at 537-38,72 N.W.2d at 547.
9 Wis. 2d 592, 101 N.W.2d 659 (1960).
Id at 594, 101 N.W.2d at 661.
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case law and held that incorporating the territory and including in it the
plaintiff's parcel were constitutional."
V. COURTS WILL ADD RESTRICTIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS To

THEM

The next major theme in the case law on the enigmatic phrases is
that courts will add restrictions and qualifications to the grants of statutemaking power that the constitution bestows. Bull v. Conroe,9 the
first case in which a court clearly distinguished between constitutional
provisions that were self-executing and those that required statutemaking and the first case holding that the enigmatic phrases imposed a
duty to enact statutes, is also the first case in which a court asserted its
authority to add restrictions and qualifications to the authority that the
enigmatic phrases grant. In that case, Luther Dixon, one of the more
impressive of the justices who have sat on the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, wrote, "I cannot assent to the doctrine that the discretionary
power given to the legislature is absolute and unlimited, and that it may
not do violence to the clause [that gave it the power to specify the property that is exempt from execution], as well by exempting too much as
too little, or by protecting those things which are not of the necessary
comforts of life as well as by refusing to protect those which are."' Justice Dixon did not assert the basis of his authority to "write in" limits,
but it apparently was the constitutional provision that vested judicial
power, including the power to interpret the constitution, in the judiciary.9 In this case, however, he held that no violence was done to the
constitution by an act that annexed the debtor's land, even though the
annexation made an exemption from execution inapplicable to it.
The most defensible of the limits to the authority granted by an enigmatic phrase is that a statute that is enacted on that basis may not
violate another constitutional provision. That holding, too, may be
found in Bull v. Conroe.' Justice Dixon began his opinion thus: "I entirely concur with the counsel for the respondent in the position that all
parts of the constitution are equally binding and imperative."93 He went
on to consider whether the annexation was an uncompensated taking

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 598-99, 101 N.W.2d at 662.
13 Wis. 260 (1860).
Id. at 267.
WIS. CONST. art VII, § 2.
13 Wis. 260 (1860).
Id. at 264.
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and thus unconstitutional, 9' and held that it was not.95 This limit was
also applied in State ex rel. Sweet and another v. Cunningham and others,96 which concerned the sale of school lands. A portion of the constitution directed provision "by law" for the sale of school landsY The
court held that another part of the constitution 8 created the school
fund, which included the proceeds from the sale of school lands, as a
trust fund, thereby dedicating it for educational purposes and making
unconstitutional a statute directing that some of the proceeds be used
for a state park. 9 At issue in State ex rel. Melms v. Young 'Mowas a statute requiring nonpartisan elections of public officials in counties that
have a population of at least 250,000 (at that time, only Milwaukee
County). The statute rested on the legislature's constitutional authority
to declare the means of electing certain county officers.0 1 The court
held that this authority did not negate the constitutional requirement
that the system of county government be as "nearly uniform as practicable."' ' The court held that the legislature may classify counties, for
example by population, but only if there is a rational reason not to treat
them all alike, and it held that no such reason justified the statute that
was challenged.' 3
Another limit appeared in a case on a law' 4 that regulated the rates
charged by railroads and created railroad commissioners to enforce
those regulations. The constitutional basis upon which this law rested
was a grant of authority to create corporations and to alter or repeal
their charters.' 5 The law was challenged in Attorney General v. Railroad Companies.)° The court agreed with Judge Cooley's statement
that a regulation applicable to corporations must be for the comfort,
welfare or safety of society (that is, it must be a valid use of the state's

94. WIS. CONsT. art I, § 13.
95. Conroe, 13 Wis. at 272.
96. 88 Wis. 81, 57 N.W. 1119 (1894).
97. WIS. CONsT. art X, § 8.
98. WIS. CONsT. art. X, § 2.
99. Id. at 83,57 N.W. at 1121.
100. 172 Wis. 197, 178 N.W. 481 (1920).
101. WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 9.
102. Id at 203-4, 178 N.W. at 482 (citing WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 23).
103. Idiat 202-3, 178 N.W. at 482.
104. Act of April 28, 1874, ch. 273, 1874 Wis. Laws 599 (an act relating to Wisconsin
railroads).
105. WIS. CONsT. art. XI, § 1.
106. 35 Wis. 425 (1874).
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police power)."° However, the court held that the attempt to regulate
the rates of a railroad under Article XI, section 1 was constitutional,
partly because federal cases that strictly interpreted the prohibition
against impairing contracts were decided during an era before the
power of corporations had grown to massive size. The court arrived at
this position even though it conceded that the charter was a contract'(1
In Huber v. Martin 9 the court interpreted more restrictively the
constitutional authority to alter and repeal corporate charters. In that
case the issue was an attempt by a mutual insurance company to transform itself into a stock company under a law that permitted that action
if certain requirements were fulfilled.1 The court held that the right to
hold property under a particular type of corporate form was a contractual right that could not be impaired, so that the law in question violated the Wisconsin constitution.' The court also held that the statute
violated the federal constitution's due process and equal protection
clauses.
In other words, the court extended to certain stockholders
the corporation's rights. Even if the corporation had certain rights that
could not be impaired, which is far from obvious, it had chosen to transform itself and had conformed to the statute that allowed that transformation. Moreover, the propriety of extending those rights to stockholders is questionable. The state had argued that its power to alter and
repeal corporate charters validated the law that allowed the action that
was being challenged, but it did not convince the court. The court in
this case thus eroded the power of the legislature and governor to alter
and repeal corporate charters.
Another railroad case, State ex rel. Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Railroad Commission,"3 followed thirty-five years later. At issue was the
obligation to pay for a railroad crossing."' The court, citing an earlier
Wisconsin case as well as a few cases from other jurisdictions, held that
the railroad had obtained a vested right because it built its line, including the point where the crossing was to be located, under a charter
before the enactment of a statute that specified the payment arrange-

107. Id. at 591-92 (quoting COOLEY'S CONST. LAW 577).

108. Id. at 592.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

127 Wis. 412,105 N.W. 1031 (1906).
Id at 415,105 N.W. 1034.
Id. at 439,105 N.W. at 1040 (citing WIS. CONST. art I, § 12).
Id (citing U.S. CONST. amend XIV).
140 Wis. 145,121 N.W. 919 (1909).
I& at 158,121 N.W. at 932.
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ment, so that it could not be made to pay for the crossing."5 The Wisconsin precedent that it cited certainly does not support the court's argument. The earlier court held that a charter that imposed an obligation on a railroad to pay taxes could be altered by statute, as it had
been, and that the taxes thus imposed were valid.11 6 That precedent,
therefore, supported the position opposite to the one that the later
court took. The later court was also well aware of, but undaunted by,
the apparently plenary power that the constitution granted to the legislature and governor to alter corporate charters; it held that that power
was less than plenary. 7
Like Chicago & N.W.R. Co. v. State, 8 the next case that limited the

constitutional authority of the legislature and governor to repeal and alter corporate charters was a response to legislation that the Progressives
enacted. The legislation at issue in the former case was the result of
Robert M. La Follette's attempt to diminish the power of railroads by
taxing and regulating them."9 The legislation in the next case, Water
Power Cases,'20 was designed to protect the environment, specifically
water resources. It was one of the incredible number of important, forward-looking pieces of legislation that were enacted during the 1911
legislative session. That legislation repealed all of the charters for dams
then in effect, subjected all the dams in the state to review by the Railroad Commission and provided that the charters of some would be renewed but the charters of others would remain invalid and those dams
would be subject to appropriation, with compensation. The court was
impressed by the economic development that the state had accomplished and attributed some of it to the dams in question.12' From Chi_
cago & N.W.R. Co. v. State'2 it picked up a minor thread: that the legislation authorized a taking without just compensation contrary to the
state and federal constitutions, although the legislation did provide for
compensation.'2 Therefore, the court invalidated the law, indicating
again that the power to alter and repeal charters, despite its appearance,

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
U.S.

Id. at 160, 121 N.W. at 924-25.
Id at 151, 121 N.W. at 925.
Id. at 161,121 N.W. at 925.
128 Wis. 553, 108 N.W. 555 (1906).
Id
148 Wis. 124, 134 N.W. 330 (1912).
Id. at 142-43, 134 N.W. at 336-37.
128 Wis. 553, 108 N.W. 557 (1906).
Wausau State R.R., 148 Wis. at 136, 134 N.W. at 337. See Wis. CONST. art. I, § 9;
CONST. amend. 5.
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was not plenary.
State ex rel. Cleary v. Hopkins Street Building & Loan Association"
resembles Huber v. Martin in that it involved both a corporate charter
and an attempt to change the form of a corporation. A state building
and loan association, acting under a Wisconsin statute, became a member of, and a borrower from, the Federal Home Loan Bank.1 5 Shortly
before the Wisconsin law was enacted, the federal government enacted
a law that allowed members of the Federal Home Loan Bank that fulfilled certain requirements to become federal savings and loan associations." The Hopkins Street Building and Loan Association and two
other savings and loan associations attempted to do so.1' An action was
brought against the former association to declare the conversion void,
and actions were brought by two other savings and loan associations to
restrain the Commissioner of Banking from preventing their conversion
to federal associations." The three actions were consolidated.1 29 The
court held that the state law authorizing the transformation was unconstitutional because it allowed a "fundamental and radical change in the
purpose of a corporation,"'3 0 a result that may not be accomplished if
even one stockholder dissents. By holding that a single stockholder
could prevent the alteration of a corporate charter, the court implied
that the constitutional provision that apparently granted to the legislature the right to alter charters was a virtual nullity.
In State ex rel. Van Alstine v. Frear3'the court did not hold that a
statute was unconstitutional but it did specify limits to the power of the
legislature and governor to enact elections laws. A section of the constitution begins "[f]aws may be enacted:" and proceeds to list a number
of subjects related to elections.132 That section does not state any limits
to the lawmaking authority on that subject. The court, however, held
that although the legislature may regulate the exercise of the franchise,
it may not deny the franchise or make its exercise so difficult that it is in
effect denied.'33 The court's approach resembles the approach of the
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

217 Wis. 179,257 N.W. 684 (1934).
Id. at 182,257 N.W. at 260.
Id. at 183, 257 N.W. at 261.
Id.
Id. at 184,257 N.W. at 262.
Id.
Id. at 190,257 N.W. at 688.
142 Wis. 320,125 N.W. 961 (1910).
WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2.
Id. at 341,125 N.W. at 968.
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courts that held that the authority to make laws incorporating municipalities did not extend to the creation of shams. That is, regulation is
one thing and prohibition masked as regulation is another, just as a village is one thing and a pseudo-village is another. The court, however,
held that the statute before it, which dealt with the election of United
States senators, merely regulated elections and thus did not violate the
constitution. T3
Like the court in State ex rel. Van Alstine v. Frear,the court in Weed
5 stated limits to the authority to enact laws, even though the
v. Bergh"1
constitutional provision that created that authority did not limit it. The
pertinent constitutional provision authorized the legislature to enact a
law to regulate the banking business.'36 The bank that brought this case
objected to the statutory requirement that banks be corporations. The
court stated that banking was a common-law right and thus could not be
prohibited, including prohibition under the guise of regulation, and that,
although banking could be regulated, that regulation must be
"reasonably necessary to secure the public welfare and safety."'3'
Granting the common law precedence over the constitution is odd indeed, particularly in light of the constitutional provision that states that
only the parts of the common law that do not conflict with the constitution remain in effect. 8 In contrast, the statement that prohibition in the
guise of regulation is unconstitutional is in the spirit of State ex rel. Van
Alstine v. Frearand the municipal incorporation cases. Although the
court in Weed v. Bergh set forth limits where none exist in the constitution, it held that the statute did not violate those limits. Specifically, it
found the regulation to be reasonable, noting, for example, that forcing
banks to be corporations would ensure continuity if an owner died. 9
The authority for the two most basic functions of state government,
taxing and spending, is granted, in whole or in part, by means of enigmatic statements, which is one reason why this topic is important. One
constitutional provision states that "[t]he legislature shall provide for an
annual tax sufficient to defray the estimated expenses of the state for
each year."'" The uniformity clause 4' of the constitution applies to both
134. Id, at 351.
135. 141 Wis. 569, 124 N.W. 664 (1910).
136. Id at 572, 124 N.W. at 667 (relying on Wis. CONST. art. XI, § 41).
137. Id. at 573, 125 N.W. at 665 (citing 1 MORSE, BANKS & BANKING § 13 (4th ed.)).
138. WIS. CONST. art. XIV, § 13.
139. 151 Wis. 569, 124 N.W. 664 (1910).
140. WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 5.
141. WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
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state and local taxes, and it explicitly authorizes some taxes and implicitly authorizes others. The authority to spend is implicit in the statement in the constitution that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation by law." ' 42 That is, if the
legislature and governor may spend only by means of statutory appropriations, they implicitly have the right to spend. The constitution explicitly limits the spending authority by requiring a balanced budget.'
The courts have also limited the authority to tax and to spend. The
primary court-made limit to the taxing authority of both the state and
local units of government is the principle that the unit of government
that imposes a tax must be the unit of government that spends the proceeds of that tax.' The court enunciated this principle in nine cases.1 45
In one of them, Bus6 v. Smith, the court connected this doctrine to the
public purpose doctrine: "the purpose of the tax must be one which pertains to the public purpose of the district within which .the tax is to be
levied and raised."46 That connection indicated that the court was not
concocting this doctrine out of thin air. Rather, it is a logical extension
of the doctrine that taxes may be levied only for public purposes. It
would make no sense to validate a tax because it served the public purpose of a jurisdiction other than the one that imposed the tax.
The public purpose doctrine in its general form is the other courtmade limit to the state's taxing and spending authority. It also applies
to the taxing and spending authority of other units of government, but
because that authority is not granted in constitutional provisions that
contain an enigmatic phrase the doctrine as it applies to other units of
government is not relevant here. The authors of two articles carefully
analyzed the doctrine. 4 7 A third author used one of the public purpose
doctrine cases as the basis of a discussion of several jurisprudential is142. WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
143. WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 5.
144. On the authority to tax in this state in general and on this limit in particular, see
Jack Stark, The Authority to Tax in Wisconsin, 77 MARQ. L. RV. 457 (1994).
145. Sigma Tau Gamma Fraternity House v. City of Menomonie, 93 Wis. 2d 392, 288
N.W.2d 85 (1980); Bus6 v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976); State ax reL Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 208 N.W.2d 780 (1973); State ex rel American Legion 1941
Convention Corp. v. Smith, 235 Wis. 443,293 N.W. 161 (1940); State ex reL. Wis. Dev. Auth.
v. Dammann, 228 Wis. 147, 280 N.W. 698 (1938); State ex rel. City of New Richmond v.
Davidson, 114 Wis. 563, 88 N.W. 596 (1902); Lund v. Chippewa County, 93 Wis. 640, 67 N.W.
927 (1896); Broadhead v. City of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 658 (1865).
146. 74 Wis. 2d 550,577,247 N.W.2d 141,160 (1976).
147. Lewis R. Mills, The Public Purpose Doctrine in Wisconsin (PartsI and I1), 1957
WIS. L. REV. 40,282; William F. Eich, A New Look at the InternalImprovements and Public
PurposeRules, 1970 WIS. L. REv. 1113.
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sues.' 4' These authors identified eight cases in which courts declared
statutes authorizing state taxing or state spending unconstitutional because they violated the general public purpose doctrine.14 9 In his article
Judge Eich also cited a number of cases in which the court assumed the
validity of the doctrine but held that the statute had a state public purpose." In addition to the cases mentioned in those articles, there are
several other relevant public purpose cases. One of them, State ex rel.
Garrett v. Froehlich,' involved a complicated flow of money. The state
had required counties to pay for the treatment of "habitual drunkards., 1 2 Acting in reliance on that law, a number of persons had established treatment clinics and had incurred expenses. After that law was
declared unconstitutional, a law was enacted to reimburse those persons. The second law was then declared unconstitutional on public purpose grounds. 53
The court in an early case held that another kind of authority
granted by one of the enigmatic phrases is not plenary. In State ex rel.
Raymer v. Cunningham"' the court remarked that in the constitutional
provision "the supervision of public instruction shall be vested in a state
superintendent, and such other officers as the legislature shall direct," 55 "other officers" means assistants and clerks.156 In other words,
the legislature was not free to create positions for subordinate educa-

148. Samuel Mermin, Concerning the Ways of Courts: Reflections Induced by the Wisconsin "InternalImprovement" and "Public Purpose" Cases, 1963 WIS. L. REV. 192.
149. State ex rel. La Follette v. Reuter, 33 Wis. 2d 384, 147 N.W.2d 304 (1967); State ex
rel.Thomson v. Giessel, 265 Wis. 558, 61 N.W.2d 903 (1953); State ex rel. Martin v. Giessel,
252 Wis. 363,31 N.W. 2d 626 (1948); State ex rel. American Legion 1941 Convention Corp. v.
Smith, 235 Wis. 443, 293 N.W. 161 (1940); State ex rel. Wis. Dev. Auth. v. Dammann, 228
Wis. 147,280 N.W. 698 (1938) (which also held that the statute violated the principle that the
unit of government that imposes a tax must be the unit of government that spends the proceeds of the tax); State ex rel. Consol. Stone Co. v. Houser, 125 Wis. 256, 104 N.W. 77 (1905);
Wis. Keeley Inst. Co. v. Milwaukee County, 95 Wis. 153,70 N.W. 68 (1897); Attorney Gen. v.
City of Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400 (1875). These authors missed a few of Justice Luther Dixon's
opinions (see JACK STARK, THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 219-224
(1997)).
150. Appeal of Van Dyke, 217 Wis. 528, 259 N.W. 700 (1935); State ex reL Atwood v.
Johnson, 170 Wis. 218, 175 N.W. 589 (1919); Brodhead v. City of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 624
(1865); State ex rel. Owen v. Donald, 160 Wis. 21, 151 N.W. 331 (1915); Hasbrouck v. City of
Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 37 (1860); Soens v. City of Racine, 10 Wis. 214 (1860).
151. 118 Wis. 129, 94 N.W. 50 (1903).
152. Id. at 130-31, 94 N.W. at 52.
153. Id. at 143, 94 N.W. at 55.
154. 82 Wis. 39, 51 N.W. 1133 (1892).
155. Id. at 48,51 N.W. at 1135.
156. Id. at 48,51 N.W. at 1135.
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tional officers in any way that it chose. Two Opinions of the Attorney
General reiterated that interpretation and stated that all "other officers" must be under the direction of the State Superintendent." Those
opinions are based on State ex rel. Raymer v. Cunningham and on the
debate during the state constitutional convention. In State ex rel.
Thompson v. Craney,"' the court followed those Attorney General's
Opinions and State ex rel. Raymer v. Cunningham, holding that all
"other" state educational officers must be under the direction of the
State Superintendent of Public Instruction and that, therefore, statutes
that created a Department of Education and stripped the State Superintendent's office of most of its powers were unconstitutional. "9
Not surprisingly, courts have been loath to grant plenary power to
the legislature and governor, on the basis of an enigmatic statement, in
regard to judicial matters. At issue in State ex rel. Pierce v. Kundert1
was a statute that detached Green County from its judicial circuit, created a circuit that included only that county, created a term for the circuit court judge that was briefer than the terms of the other circuit court
judges in the state and specified that if the same person was not both
circuit court judge and county court judge the circuit court judge would
be paid only $1,500 annually, which was considerably less than the other
circuit court judges received. The purported authority for this statute
was a constitutional provision that allowed the legislature to specify the
terms of office and the compensation of circuit court judges.'61 Nevertheless, the court held that that differential treatment of Green County
judges was unconstitutional, because that county had no relevant characteristics that distinguished it from other counties. 2
The decision in an extremely difficult case, In Matter of Guardianship of Eberhardy,' resulted in the diminution of the power of both the
courts and the legislature. At issue was the sterilization of a severely
mentally retarded person. The constitution grants to the circuit courts
broad jurisdiction: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the circuit
court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal

157.
158.
159.
(1996).
160.
161.
162.
163.

37 Op. Att'y Gen. of Wis. 82 (1948); 37 Op. Att'y Gen. of Wis. 347 (1948).
199 Wis. 2d 674,546 N.W.2d 123 (1996).
State ex re Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 698-99, 546 N.W.2d 123, 130
4 Wis. 2d 392, 90 N.W.2d 628 (1958).
Id at 394,90 N.W.2d at 630 (citing Wis. CONST. art. VII, § 7).
Id. at 396,90 N.W.2d at 632.
102 Wis. 2d 539,307 N.W.2d 881 (1981).
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within this state."'' " In other words, it is presumed that a circuit court
has jurisdiction, but the legislature and governor may limit that jurisdiction. In this case, the Supreme Court directed circuit courts to refrain
from exercising their jurisdiction in order to allow the sterilization of
65 That is,
persons who cannot give informed consent to the procedure."
the Supreme Court, not the legislature and the governor, limited the
circuit courts' jurisdiction. That limitation was accomplished not "by
law" but by exercise of the Supreme Court's authority to supervise the
lower courts.'" Although in so doing it reduced the judicial authority of
circuit courts, the Supreme Court also held that the authority of the
legislature and governor to limit the circuit courts' jurisdiction was not
plenary but was shared with the Supreme Court. The issue in this case
nominally was jurisdiction, but the case's result was substantive. The
effect of the decision is that Wisconsin courts may not allow sterilization of persons who cannot give informed consent to the procedure.
Mueller v. Brunn was about a limitation "by law" of the jurisdiction
of a court in accordance with the constitutional provision on that subject.' 67 A statute provided that actions about damage to property must
be brought in the county where the property is located. After an historical interlude about the common law and an allusion to a very old
federal case, the court, despite the statute, held that the case could be
brought in the county where the plaintiffs resided, because the alleged
wrong was not really a damage to property." That result, based on long
obsolete common law actions, is a bit of a stretch. The court's true motivation might instead be revealed in the final sentence of the opinion:
"[i]t is time that the legislature revise these archaic Wisconsin venue
statutes and bring them into conformity with reality.' ' 69 That statement
appears to be an implicit recognition that the statute really did require
the venue in the case to be the county where the property was located
and that it took some judicial prestidigitation to avoid that result.
Under the constitution the legislature may provide that in civil cases
agreement of a specified number of jurors will constitute a valid verdict.'70 The only constitutional limit on this authority is that the specified number must be at least five-sixths of the jury. Soon after this con164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

WIS. CONST. art.

VII, § 8.

Eberhard,102 Wis. 2d at 578,307 N.W.2d at 899.
WIS. CONsT. art. VII, § 3, cl.
1.
105 Wis. 2d 171,313 N.W.2d 790 (1982).
Id. at 189,313 N.W.2d at 794.
Id. at 190,313 N.W.2d at 799.
WIS. CONsT. art. I, § 5.
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stitutional provision was ratified, a statute was enacted that allowed
agreement by ten jurors to constitute a valid verdict. That statute was
an issue in Dick v. Heisler.7 ' The court held that a verdict was valid
only if the same ten jurors agreed to the answer of each question that
was submitted to them.' The court argued that parties have a common-law right to a special verdict and that, if one were allowed, affirmative answers by different combinations of jurors would constitute disagreement."' That is true, but it required one leap of faith to arrive at
the case's holding in regard to general verdicts and another leap of faith
to arrive at the conclusion that the relevant constitutional provision
should in effect be qualified. Nevertheless, the holding has been a
precedent for courts in a long series of cases. 74
VI. THE AUTHORITY Is NOT NECESSARILY EXCLUSIVE

A recent case added a twist to the courts' response to the enigmatic
phrases. The constitution states that circuit courts have "such appellate
jurisdiction in the circuit as the legislature may prescribe by law."' 75
That part of the constitution was relevant in In Matter of Mental Condition of C.M.B. 76 A court commissioner had denied a petition for involuntary commitment. The central issue of the case was whether that order could be appealed directly to the Court of Appeals. The Supreme
Court held that the next step was review by the circuit court."n The
court based its holding in part on a definition of "appeal" that applies
only to a chapter that pertains only to the Courts of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, not to circuit courts, and ignored the reference to "in
the circuit" in the constitution. If one assumes that the review by the
circuit court that the Supreme Court, because of the holding in this case,
now requires of decisions by court commissioners about petitions for
171. 184 Wis. 77,198 N.W. 734 (1924).
172. Id. at 86,198 N.W. at 737.
173. Id at 86-87, 198 N.W. at 737-38.
174. Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis. 2d 171,313 N.W.2d 790 (1982); Wendel v. Little, 15 Wis.
2d 52, 112 N.W.2d 172 (1961); Fleischhacker v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 274 Wis.
215,79 N.W.2d 817 (1956); McCauley v. International Trading Co., 268 Wis. 62, 66 N.W.2d 633
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commitment is actually appellate authority in the circuit-an assumption that has some attractiveness-the court granted appellate jurisdiction to circuit courts even though the constitution bestows the power to
do so solely to the legislature. If so, this case is unlike those in which
the court qualified constitutional grants of authority to the legislature
and governor. Rather, this case indicates that constitutional grants of
authority made by an enigmatic phrase are not exclusive. That, in turn,
is another reason to conclude that those grants of authority are not the
final word on the subject and that, therefore, the authority is not plenary.
VII. CONCLUSION

Cases interpret only some of the enigmatic phrases that appear in
the state constitution. However, many of those phrases have been illuminated by courts, and there is a voluminous case law that is relevant to
them. That body of case law justifies four conclusions: those phrases
indicate that the constitutional provision in which they appear is not
self-executing, they impose a duty on the legislature to act (although
courts do not order compliance if the legislature fails to do so), they do
not authorize shams and courts feel free to qualify or limit them. The
first two conclusions are not of great practical significance, because laws
have already been enacted if they were required. They are important
mainly because they signal that the plain meaning of those phrases is
not their only meaning. That fact becomes even more obvious upon
consideration of the cases that lead to the third and fourth conclusions.
Those two conclusions combine to produce the quintessence of the case
law on the enigmatic phrases: those phrases do not grant plenary power
to the legislature and governor.

